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and 
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One of the most vexing issues in constitutional jurisprudence concerns the 
political regulation of money and its democratic implications.  The resolution of the 
constitutional question for democracy involves striking a balance between two 
competing interests: the protection of political liberty under the First Amendment and 
the legitimate interest government has in preventing money from having a corrosive or 
corrupting effect on the political system.  With its landmark ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,1 
some say that the Supreme Court successfully reconciled these interests and, in fact, 
strongly preserved the basic ideal of American freedom.  Different commentators, 
however, maintain that the Supreme Court managed to protect neither interest 
adequately.  Still others familiar with campaign finance adopt a more neutral position, 
implying that Buckley is a sound ruling but nonetheless leaves many key constitutional 
issues and public policy questions unsettled. To be sure, the range of debate 
surrounding Buckley illustrates that it is the basis for legal and political controversy.2 
 
There are several reasons why Buckley is the point of departure for 
comprehending the modern campaign finance debate.  In deciding the issue of whether 
Congress could regulate political money under the 1974 Amendments to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (reform legislation inspired by the Watergate scandal), the 
Supreme Court of the United States created an analytical distinction between 
contributions and expenditures.  The act of contributing money, the Court ruled, is 
properly subject to congressional regulation (and generally tested by a less rigorous 
standard of judicial review) because it only minimally intrudes upon a donor’s ability to 
express their underlying support for a candidate or group in an election.  In contrast, 
since “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s
                                                 
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
2 DANIEL R. ORTIZ, The Reform Debate: Politics and the First Amendment, in CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK   95-97 (1997). 
1
Banks and Green: Buckley v. Valeo
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW         [Vol. 33:1 
 
mass society requires the expenditure of money,”3 government-imposed limitations on 
political spending are subject to strict scrutiny.  Under this heightened standard of 
judicial review, the Court held that the restrictions substantially, and improperly, burden 
political expression.4  Accordingly, the underlying interests of the First Amendment are 
not only the basis for creating the distinction between political spending and giving, but 
they also directly affect the level of scrutiny that the Justice’s applied to the 1974 
Amendments and, later on, many other post-1976 campaign finance cases.5 
 
In addition to testing expenditure limitations with a more rigorous standard of 
judicial review, the Court used the difference between political expenditures and 
contributions to articulate a standard for government efforts to prevent corruption.  The 
Court held that restrictions on contributions are constitutionally permissible on the 
grounds that the government has a strong interest in curbing the threat of the political 
quid pro quo, a reality or appearance that dollars are exchanged for votes or favors.  
Buckley also holds, though, that preventing the reality or appearance of corruption is 
not an acceptable rationale for reducing the quantity and diversity speech in elections. 
For example, the Court struck down the provision of the 1974 Amendments that 
imposed a $1,000 limitation on spending “relative to a clearly identified candidate” 
(which regulates spending that is uncoordinated with a specific candidate) because the 
Court reasoned that such a prohibition is unjustified since there is little opportunity for 
the politician to control the expenditure and use it as a means to secure improper 
influence.6  Notably, too, the Court employed the interest in stopping corruption as the 
intellectual foundation for supporting the disclosure and reporting requirements imposed 
by the 1974 Amendments.7 
 
                                                 
3 Id. at 19. 
4 Id. at 58-59.  See also  SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 620 (1998) (observing that the Court has generally 
extended broad protection to all candidate expenditures by using strict scrutiny whereas it 
permitted content-neutral contributions under a less stringent standard of review).  See also 
GERALD GUNTHER AND KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1409 (1997), (stating 
that the Buckley Court applied a lower degree of scrutiny to the contribution limits than to the 
spending limits which, in turn, allowed it to uphold the contribution limits as preventing 
actual or the appearance of corruption). 
5 See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.v. Federal Election Comm’n., 116 S.Ct. 
2309 (1996); Federal Election Comm. v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480 (1985); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
6 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51. 
7 See id. at 60-84. 
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Apart from the constitutional distinction it formulated and the emphasis it gave 
to whether the limitations prevented the reality or appearance of political corruption, 
Buckley is controversial because it does not require equality in the funding of 
campaigns.  By stating that the “First Amendment denies government the power to 
determine that spending to promote one’s political views is wasteful, excessive, or 
unwise,”8 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that campaign finance regulations can 
legitimately restrict advantages in monetary resources in campaigns.  The attainment of 
political equality, in other words, is not an express or implied goal of the Buckley 
decision that, in turn, arguably skews electoral outcomes in favor of monied interests 
and inherently treats candidates with lesser financial resources unfairly.9 
 
Not surprisingly, the principles announced in Buckley have far reaching 
implications for the operation of the American political system.  For instance, in striking 
down expenditure limits and, in effect, characterizing money as highly protected 
speech,10 the decision is the impetus for political actors to engage in unlimited campaign 
spending, despite the common view that unlimited spending is a serious problem.11  
American politics is also affected by what the Buckley decision actually decided and 
what issues remain open by virtue of what the Supreme Court did not do in ruling itself 
or in subsequent cases.  To illustrate, since Buckley condoned all of the spending 
limitation provisions of the 1974 Amendments relating to voluntary public funding of 
presidential campaigns, it has indirectly suggested that voluntary spending limits will 
pass constitutional muster in other analogous contexts.12  Or since the Court, in 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
                                                 
8 Id. at 57.  Notably, the Court made this remark in the course of invalidating limitations on 
overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking election to federal office. 
9JAMIN B. RASKIN & JOHN BONIFAZ, THE WEALTH PRIMARY: CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1994). 
10 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (J. White, concurring and dissenting). 
11 See, e.g., David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between 
Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 32, 93-00 (1998), 
(observing that various polls suggest that the overall impact of campaign spending has a 
corrosive effect on voter confidence in the political system).  There is little question that 
candidates for federal public office raise and spend large amounts of political money.  The 
Federal Election Committee reports, for example, that congressional candidates raised a total 
of $790.5 million and spent $765.3 million in the 1995-96 election cycle.  Federal Election 
Commission, Congressional Fundraising and Spending Up Again  in 1996. (visited on April 
26, 1998) <http://www.fec.gov/press/canye96.htm>. 
12 See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign 
Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97, 99 (1986).   
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Committee13 held that political parties may spend an unlimited amount of money in 
congressional elections if the expenditures are considered independent (that is, 
uncoordinated with a candidate or his campaign), it raised the possibility that 
coordinated spending by political parties may get First Amendment protection in the 
future.14  Also, since in its 1998-1999 term the Court has granted review in Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC,15 the issue of whether a state can constitutionally 
set contribution limits that are too low will also become part of the complex framework 
of legal precedent that epitomize the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.   
 
As the foregoing suggests, perhaps most importantly Buckley clearly invites an 
extended discussion about the proper role that judiciary plays in superintending the 
political process.  As one commentator put it, with Buckley “unwittingly, the Supreme 
Court became one of the prime architects of the ‘new era’ in American campaign 
finance.”16  The suggestion that the judicial branch, instead of the legislature, controls 
the political regulation of money is of great significance in terms of American politics 
and constitutional democratic theory.  Not only does it imply that an unelected judiciary 
is making public policy that directly affects political representation, but it also 
underscores the reality that the Supreme Court is increasingly diving head-first into the 
so called “political thicket”17 and wielding its discretion to superintend the political 
process.  
 
This symposium, which is an extension of a panel discussion held in Akron, 
Ohio in September 1998,18 addresses the issue of judicial control over campaigns 
                                                 
13 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). 
14 Lower courts have already addressed this issue.  See, e.g., F.E.C. v. Colorado Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F.Supp.2d 1197 (D. Colo.1999) (holding that Congress cannot limit 
coordinated spending of political parties as a matter of law). 
15 Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 
S. Ct. 901 (1999). 
16 Sorauf, supra  note 12, at 100. 
17 The term “political thicket” is used by Justice Felix Frankfurter in writing the Opinion for the 
Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), where the Supreme Court dismissed a 
redistricting challenge on the grounds that the case involved a political question. 
18 The conference, entitled Parties, Politics, and the Law: Toward a More Representative 
Democracy, was held on September 25, 1998 in Akron, Ohio and sponsored by the University 
of Akron’s Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics and the Constitutional Law Center of the 
School of Law. The articles written for this symposium stem from the discussion at the 
conference between the contributors on a panel entitled “Campaign Finance and the Legal 
Impact of Buckley v. Valeo.”  
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and elections by presenting the viewpoints of three well-known scholars who are 
actively involved in the controversy that Buckley generates.   
 
In the first article law professor Joel Gora, who also acted as co-counsel for 
the plaintiffs in the Buckley ruling, strongly defends the decision as a landmark of 
political freedom.  For Gora, Buckley correctly invalidated expenditure limitations 
because to do otherwise would improperly restrict how much speech an individual 
could engage in during an election, a critical time in a democracy when citizens need to 
associate and discuss important issues about the candidates and their campaigns.   
Working from the premise that the people in a democracy (and not the government) 
have the sole power to control political expression, Gora also quickly dismisses the 
notion that government has the right to impose limits on spending for the purpose of 
equalizing monetary resources in a competitive election.  Achieving that sort of equal 
opportunity is not only impracticable, Gora maintains, but it also threatens core values 
of the First Amendment.  After defending Buckley and the First Amendment principles 
it represents, Gora then criticizes recent legislative efforts to enact campaign finance 
reform on the grounds that the legislation embodies the same kind of limits-based 
approach that have failed in the past.  At the end of his discussion, Gora proposes 
several alternatives for reform -- which include raising or repealing all limits on 
campaign contributions or expenditures -- that in his view expand political opportunities 
without limiting political speech. 
  
In contrast, John Bonifaz, Gregory Luke, and Brenda Wright, as 
representatives of the National Voting Rights Institute, attack Buckley for the very 
reason that Gora embraces it: that it condones unlimited spending in American politics.  
For the authors, unlimited spending – along with the guiding maxim of Buckley that 
“money is speech” --is a serious threat to the democratic process because it undermines 
public confidence in elections, it increases the danger of actual political corruption, and 
it interferes with the governing duties of our elected representatives.  After noting that 
Buckley does not enjoy wide support in the academic and legal communities, they also 
maintain that the ruling wrongly undermines the principle of political equality by 
allowing wealthy candidates to stifle the ability of candidates with less money to 
compete fairly in the electoral arena.  For these reasons and others Bonifaz, Luke, and 
Wright assert that the time has come to re-visit Buckley and all it represents by adopting 
a new strategy for reform, one that has already taken hold in the states and in recent 
court cases.  As the authors observe, this new legal movement – which, in part, 
emphasizes developing a strong factual record in litigation to defend spending limits – 
presents a formidable challenge to Buckley and presents a cogent argument for 
campaign finance reform that is principled and just in a democracy.   
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Attorney Trevor Potter, a partner of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wiley, 
Fein, and Fielding and former commissioner and chairman of the Federal Election 
Commission, completes the symposium by objectively exploring the status and 
limitations of Buckley in the context of political disclosure.  After observing that the 
ruling generates the most consensus by endorsing the principle of prompt disclosure of 
election finance data, Potter surveys the limitations of the decision by indicating that the 
Court has left unanswered many constitutional questions about the scope of permissible 
disclosure in campaign finance law.  As a result of the Court’s inconsistent and often 
unpredictable approach in deciding where to draw the line between permissible 
regulation and disclosure, Potter suggests that full disclosure is a favored, but elusive, 
goal of campaign finance law.   Even so, in his article Potter offers a useful four-part 
test to analyze the constitutionality of disclosure legislation.  In doing so, he shows that 
Buckley retains some analytical force in spite of its incoherence or ambiguity as a 
controlling constitutional principle in campaign and election law. 
  
The contributions to this symposium highlight the prominent role that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has in shaping issues that cross at the intersection 
between law and politics.  As a result, the articles underscore the reality that the Court 
is a political institution that not only often decides issues of constitutional liberty, but 
one that also controls in a very direct way the practical operation of the electoral 
process.  By analyzing the scope and limitations of the campaign finance debate through 
the Buckley ruling, each author therefore indicates that the Court’s intervention in the 
political process has enormous implications for the extent to which money is the legal 
basis for expanding or restricting political freedom and, simultaneously, the source or 
destruction of democratic ideals. 
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